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Abstract
The companion piece to this article captures and generalizes empirical
adequacy in terms of vagueness sets. In this article, I show that previous
attempts to capture and generalize empirical adequacy in terms of partial
structures fail. Indeed, the motivations for the partial structures approach
are better met by vagueness sets, which can be used to generalize the partial
structure approach.
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1 Introduction
Constructive empiricism, with its central notion of empirical adequacy, and the
partial structures approach, with its central notions of quasi-truth and partial
isomorphism, are two major lines of research and influence in the semantic view,
according to which scientific theories are best represented by model- or set the-
oretic structures. Combining the two approaches, da Costa and French (1990),
Bueno (1997), and da Costa et al. (1998) have discussed a means to describe empiri-
cal adequacy as quasi-truth, and Bueno (1997) has used partial isomorphisms and
quasi-truths to generalize empirical adequacy.
The initial motivation for Bueno’s generalizations was Suárez’s criticism of
constructive empiricism. I briefly show that both the criticism (§B) and Bueno’s
reply (§C) fail. What is more, I argue that the attempts to describe empirical
adequacy and to generalize empirical adequacy using partial structures fail as well
(§§3.1, 4).
In the companion piece to this article (Lutz 2011), I have shown that empirical
adequacy is under certain conditions equivalent to generalized approximate truth,
and have suggested a generalization of empirical adequacy in terms of vagueness
sets that can deal with lack of knowledge and approximations. In this article, I will
show that the central concepts of the partial structure approach, quasi-truth (§2.2)
and partial isomorphisms (§4.1) can be captured with the help of vagueness sets,
too, and that the generalizations of empirical adequacy in terms of approximate
truth achieves the goals of the generalizations in terms of partial structures (§3.2).
2 Two formalisms
I will rely on the standard notations used in model theory.1 A structure A is a
pair 〈A,I 〉 consisting of a domain A and a function I from a set of ni -place
relation symbols Ri , n j -place function symbols F j , and constant symbols ck
to, respectively, ni -ary relations, n j -ary functions, and constants on A. Unless
otherwise noted, all structures and partial structures will be for the symbols
{Ri , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K with their respective arity. In the following, I will sometimes
refer to symbols as ‘terms’ when this does not lead to ambiguity. Sometimes, I
1I defend this choice of notation and the definitions given in §2.1 in this article’s companion
piece.
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use indexed structuresMi instead of A,B, etc. A will always be the domain |A|
of A, B = |B| etc. If A = 〈A,I 〉, I write RAi instead of I (Ri ), and analogously
for functions and constants. RBi is the relation inB that corresponds to relation
RAi in A, and analogous for functions and constants. In displayed form, I write
a structure A as 〈A, RA1 , . . . , RAs , F A1 , . . . , F At , cA1 , . . . , cAu 〉 or, for possibly infinite
index sets, 〈A, RAi , F Aj , cAk 〉i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K .
2.1 Empirical adequacy
Within constructive empiricism, van Fraassen (1980, 64) gives the following defini-
tion (cf. van Fraassen 2008, 238):
Definition 1. A theory is a family {Tn}n∈N of structures (the models of the theory)
such that each of its members Tn = 〈Tn , RTni , F Tnj , cTnk 〉i∈In , j∈Jn ,k∈Kn has a set En
of empirical substructures, such that for each E ∈ En , E⊆Tn . With each model, a
theory also contains every isomorphic structure and its corresponding2 empirical
substructures.
With O being the set of observable objects, van Fraassen (1980, 64) gives
Definition 2. Appearances are given by a set P of structures such that the domain
of eachP ∈ P is a subset of O. A structureP ∈ P is an appearance.
Definition 3. A theory {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for appearances P if and
only if there is some n ∈ N such that for every P ∈ P, there is an E ∈ En with
E∼=P.
In this terminology, van Fraassen (1980, 12, emphasis removed) defines con-
structive empiricism as the claim that science “aims to give us theories which are
empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is
empirically adequate”.
2.2 Quasi-truth
The partial structures approach is motivated by a simple epistemological point:
Most of the time, scientists do not have enough information about a domain to
determine its structure with arbitrary precision. For most relations, it is at best
known of some tuples of objects that they fall under the relation and known of
some objects that they do not fall under it. For many if not most tuples this is
unknown. Similarly, the value of a function is not know for all of its possible
arguments. Partial structures are defined to take this lack of knowledge into
account.
2If f : Tm −→ Tn is an isomorphism between Tm and Tn , then the corresponding empirical
substructures En are those structures for which f is an isomorphism to an element of Em .
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While most works on partial structures in the philosophy of science (e. g.,
da Costa and French 1990, Bueno 1997, da Costa and French 2000) do not consider
functions, and the foundational paper by Mikenberg et al. (1986) does not consider
constants, the respective definitions can be easily combined to give
Definition 4. A˜ is a partial structure for the symbols {Ri , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K if and
only if
A˜=


A, RA˜i , F
A˜
j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K , (1)
where A 6= ∅, RA˜i =


RA˜,+i , R
A˜,−
i , R
A˜,◦
i

is a tripartition of Ami for each i ∈ I ,
F A˜j : CA˜, j −→A is a function with domain CA˜, j ⊆An j for each j ∈ J , and c A˜k ∈A
for each k ∈K .
The definition of partial structures by Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 1) is recov-
ered for K =∅, the definition by da Costa and French (1990, 255f) and da Costa
et al. (1998, 605) for J =∅.3 Lack of knowledge is represented by non-empty sets
RA˜,◦i and sets CA˜, j ⊂An j .
Taking into account background knowledge, expressed by a set Π˜ of sentences,
the primary statements, Mikenberg et al. (1986, def. 2.ii) and da Costa and French
(1990, 256) give
Definition 5. StructureB is A˜-normal for primary statements Π˜ if and only if
B = A, RA˜,+i ⊆ RBi ⊆ Ami − RA,−i for each i ∈ I , FBj |C j = F A˜j for each j ∈ J ,
cBk = c
A˜
k for each k ∈K , andB  Π˜.
This allows to define quasi-truth, also called ‘pragmatic truth’ or ‘partial truth’:
Definition 6. Sentence ϕ is quasi-true in partial structure A˜ relative to primary
statements Π˜ if and only if there is a structure B that is A˜-normal for Π˜ and
B  ϕ.
3 Capturing empirical adequacy
3.1 Empirical adequacy as quasi-truth
Since a theory may be given by a family {Tn}n∈N rather than a set of sentences,
da Costa and French (1990, 256f) give4
3While da Costa and French (1990, 255) and da Costa et al. (1998, 605) define partial structures
only for relations, their further definition of A˜-normal structures presumes that partial structures
can contain constants as well.
4Da Costa and French (1990) actually assume that a theory is given by a set T, rather than a
family of structures. In such cases, I will always silently assume the family {TT |T ∈ T} associated
with the set.
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Definition 7. If {Tn}n∈N is a theory, then {Tn}n∈N is quasi-true in partial struc-
ture A˜ relative to Π˜ if and only if for some n ∈N , Tn is A˜-normal for Π˜.
If thus {Tn}n∈N is the set of models of some set H of sentences, T is quasi-true
in A˜ relative to Π˜ if and only if there is some A˜-normal structure for Π˜ in which
all elements of H are true.
Restricting their discussion to relational structures (which contain only rela-
tion symbols), da Costa and French (1990, 255) suggests to formalize our knowl-
edge of a domain by first giving a partial structure O˜=


O, RO˜i

i∈I for the set of
relation symbols {Ri}i∈I , where O is the set of observable objects. Then, they
suggest to extend the domain O by the domain U ,O ∩U =∅ of unobservable
objects and introduce further relations {Ri}i∈I ′ , I ′ ∩ I =∅ over O ∪U to arrive
at a partial structure A˜ =


O ∪U , RA˜i

i∈I∪I ′ (da Costa and French 1990, 256).
5
While they do not discuss explicitly what happens to the partial relations

RO˜i
	
i∈I
when the domain is extended, I take it that RA˜,+i = R
O˜,+
i and R
A˜,−
i = R
O˜,−
i for
each i ∈ I . In other words, the relation symbols {Ri}i∈I do not serve to describe
the unobservable objects.
Da Costa and French (1990, 257) then suggest that A˜ and the primary state-
ments “can be taken to represent [a theory’s] ‘empirical substructures’, if [the
primary statements are] restricted to observation statements only.” And this then,
they claim, “leads us to understand the ‘empirical adequacy’ of a theory as its
pragmatic truth”. But it is at least not obvious how we would do this: For one, it
is not clear in what sense A˜ “represents” the empirical substructures. As Bueno
(1997, 595) furthermore points out, if it was clear, and empirical adequacy was
then taken to be quasi-truth, it would follow that a theory is empirically adequate
if and only if it is quasi-true according to its own empirical substructure. Thus the
appearances would play no role whatsoever in the empirical adequacy of a theory.
I will now show that under specific assumptions, there is a way of capturing
empirical adequacy in terms of partial structures, because empirical adequacy
was inspired by a semantics for vague terms, and this semantics allows to capture
partial structures as well.
3.2 Quasi-truth as approximate truth
One of van Fraassen’s inspiration for the use of empirical substructures was given
by Przełe˛cki (1969; 1976), who suggested to capture the interpretation of vague
terms with the help of a multiplicity of structures, rather than one single structure.
The denotation of an mi -place relation symbol Ri that is vague over some domain
A tripartitions the product domain Ami into Ri ’s positive extension R
+
i of definite
instances, Ri ’s negative extension R
−
i of definite non-instances, and Ri ’s neutral
extension R◦ of borderline cases. The denotation of an n j -place function symbol
5Incidentally, the introduction of the nonobservational terms {Ri}i∈I ′ amounts to a bipartition
of the set of symbols akin to that in the received view on scientific theories (cf. Lutz 2011, §3).
5
Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy II—Draft: 2010–07–26
F j that is vague over A does not assign a single element b ∈ A to an n j -tuple
(a1, . . . ,an j ) ∈ An j , but rather a set F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j ) = B ⊆ A. I will refer to
the set

(a1, . . . ,an j , b ) |a1, . . . ,an j ∈ A, b ∈ F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j )
	
as the non-negative
extension F +◦ of F j . If F +◦j (a1, . . . ,an j ) is a singleton set, I will say that F j has a
positive extension for (a1, . . . ,an j ). The denotation of a constant symbol ck that is
vague over A is a set c+◦
k
⊆A. If it is a singleton set, I will say that ck has a positive
extension.
Vague terms lead to sets of structures (cf. Lutz 2011, def. 7):
Definition 8. Let the terms {Ri , F j , ck}i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K be vague over domain A with
positive, negative, and non-negative extensions {R+i , R−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K and
penumbral connections W (Ri , F j , ck)i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . ThenM is in the terms’ vague-
ness set M for A if an only if it fulfills the penumbral connections and
M =A, (2)
R+i ⊆ RMi ⊆Ami −R−i for all i ∈ I , (3)
FMj ⊆ F +◦j for all j ∈ J , and (4)
cMk ∈ c+◦k for all k ∈K . (5)
The penumbral connections exclude structures from the vagueness set that
cannot be excluded by the positive, negative, and non-negative denotations of the
terms.
Every partial structure can be expressed with the help of a vagueness set:
Definition 9. Let A˜=


A, RA˜i , F
A˜
j , c
A˜
k

i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K be a partial structure, Π˜ a set of
primary statements, and let W (Ri , F j , ck)i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K express Π˜. Then the vague-
ness set for {R+i , R−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K over A with penumbral connections
W (Ri , F j , ck )i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K and R+i = R
A˜,+
i , R
−
i = R
A˜,−
i , F
+◦
j = F
A˜
j ∪(An j −CA˜, j )⊗A,
and c+◦
k
= {c A˜k } for i ∈ I , j ∈ J , k ∈K corresponds to A˜ and Π˜.
Claim 1. For any partial structure A˜, the set of A˜-normal structures relative to Π˜ is
the corresponding vagueness set.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let B be A˜-normal for Π˜. Then B = A and B fulfills W (Ri , F j ,
ck)i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . Furthermore, R+i = R
A˜,+
i ⊆ RBi ⊆ Ami − RA,−i = Ami − R−i for
each i ∈ I , F jB|CA˜, j = F A˜j so that FBj ⊆ F A˜j ∪ (An j −CA˜, j )⊗A= F +◦j for each
j ∈ J , and cBk = c A˜k ∈ {c A˜k }= c+◦k for each k ∈ K . ThusB is in the vagueness set
corresponding to A˜ and Π˜.
‘⇐’: Let B be in the vagueness set for {R+i , R−i , F +◦j , c+◦k }i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K over A
with penumbral connections W (Ri , F j , ck)i∈I , j∈J ,k∈K . Then B = A and B  Π˜.
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Furthermore, RA˜,+i = R
+
i ⊆ RBi ⊆ Ami − R+i = Ami − RA,−i for each i ∈ I ,
FBj ⊆ F +◦j = F A˜j ∪ (An j −CA˜, j )⊗A so that F jB|CA˜, j = F A˜j , and cBk ∈ c+◦k = {c A˜k }
so that cBk = c
A˜
k . ThereforeB is A˜-normal for Π˜.
If the vagueness set corresponding to A˜ and Π˜ is a singleton set {B}, then I
will say thatB corresponds to A˜ and A˜ corresponds toB.
Since not every vagueness set corresponds to a partial structure, the notion
of a vagueness set is a proper generalization of the notion of a partial structure.
Incidentally, this generalization solves two problems stand in the way of many
applications of partial structures in the analysis of scientific theories: While the
interpretations of relation symbols in partial structures can capture fairly general
cases of lack of knowledge, there can be no lack of knowledge whatsoever when it
comes to constant symbols, because they are interpreted uniquely. And the inter-
pretation of function symbols, practically important because many mathematized
theories are teeming with functions, captures only a kind of lack of knowledge
encountered very seldomly in the sciences. For in a partial structure A˜, the values
of a function F A˜j are known with arbitrary precision over CA˜, j , but not at all
over An j −C
A˜, j . In contradistinction, the measurement of, say, the time averaged
intensity ψ of a light wave over some spatial interval [x1, x2] will typically have a
finite precision, giving a range of possible intensity values [y1, y2]⊂R≥0 for each
point x ∈ [x1, x2]. While this can be neatly captured by vagueness sets (Lutz 2011,
§4.3), a partial structure can only capture measurements that, at any point x, give
either a precise value ψ(x) = y3 ∈R≥0, or no value at all.
Przełe˛cki suggests to use vagueness sets to define approximate truth and call
a set H of sentences approximately true in a vagueness set M if and only if there
is at least one element of M in which all elements of H are true. In other words,
H is approximately true if and only if one of its models is in M. This suggest the
following definition of approximate truth for theories:
Definition 10. If M is a vagueness set and {Tn}n∈N a theory, then {Tn}n∈N is
approximately true in M if and only if for some n ∈N , Tn ∈M.
Thus if {Tn}n∈N is the family of models of a set of sentences H , {Tn}n∈N is
approximately true if and only if H is approximately true.
The relation between quasi-truth and approximate truth is given by
Claim 2. {Tn}n∈N is quasi-true in partial structure A˜ for Π˜ if and only if {Tn}n∈N
is approximately true in the corresponding vagueness set.
Proof. Immediately from claim 1.
Therefore approximate truth is a generalization of quasi-truth. Note that if a
partial structure corresponds to a structure, quasi-truth in the partial structure is
equivalent to truth in the corresponding structure.
A simple relation between quasi-truth and empirical adequacy is now given by
7
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Claim 3. Let Π˜ =∅, O˜ correspond to the appearances {P} and A˜ be the set of partial
structures A˜=


O ∪U , RA˜i 〉i∈I with RA˜,+i = RO˜,+i and RA˜,−i = RO˜,−i for each i ∈ I .
Let {Tn}n∈N be such that Tn |O ∈ En whenever O ⊆ Tn . Then {Tn}n∈N is quasi-true
in some A˜ ∈ A˜ if and only if {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for {P}.
Proof. By claim 2, {Tn}n∈N is quasi-true in some A˜ ∈ A˜ if and only if {Tn}n∈N
is approximately true in the corresponding vagueness set. By claim 1 of the
companion piece, the union of the corresponding vagueness sets is a generalized
vagueness set, so that {Tn}n∈N is quasi-true in one of the vagueness sets if and
only if {Tn}n∈N is generalized approximately true. Since |{P}| = 1, by claim 2
of the companion piece {Tn}n∈N is generalized approximately true if and only if{Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate.
Claim 3 shows that the attempt by da Costa and French (1990) of capturing
empirical adequacy as quasi-truth is, under some additional assumptions, successful
when modified in two crucial ways: First, {Tn}n∈N does not have to be quasi-true
in one specific partial structure, but may be quasi-true in any partial structure with
the positive and negative extensions as described. Second, these partial structures
must not be taken to represent the empirical substructures of a theory, but must
be taken to represent the appearances. Bueno’s objection that the appearances
play no role in da Costa and French’s attempt is thereby avoided.
However, claim 3 relies on the additional assumption that the appearances
have to be given by a single structure. This is an assumption that van Fraassen
decidedly does not make6, and thus even in this reconceptualization, da Costa
and French’s attempt to capture empirical adequacy in terms of quasi-truth is not
wholly successful.
4 Generalizing empirical adequacy
Bueno (1997) suggests to use the partial structures approach not to capture, but
rather to generalize the notion of empirical adequacy. While his two generaliza-
tions are meant to allow the formalization of common scientific practices within
constructive empiricism and have been the basis of further development and
applications of the partial structures approach, they have initially been suggested
as a response to a criticism by Suárez (1995; 2005) of empirical adequacy. I argue
in appendix B that this initial motivation is not relevant because Suárez’s criticism
fails.
Both of Bueno’s generalizations rely on the basic idea that the appearances
are seldom known well enough to be described in a set P of structures, and that
usually a set of partial structures must suffice, leading to the partial appearances P˜.
This is more than just a formal modification of the notion of empirical adequacy:
Van Fraassen is arguably justified in assuming that the appearances are represented
6Personal communication.
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by structures, because a theory has to be empirically adequate with respect to
all the appearances, known in all precision (cf. Monton and Mohler 2008, §1.5).
While van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy thus relies exclusively on what
the appearances are like, Bueno’s notion includes our lack of knowledge about
them. Bueno thus gives a generalization of empirical adequacy that takes epistemic
states into account, and should therefore be equivalent to Van Fraassen’s notion in
the special case that there is no epistemic uncertainty about the phenomena.
I will argue that both of Bueno’s generalizations of empirical adequacy are
inadequate, and that his intend is better captured by generalizations suggested in
this article’s companion piece.
4.1 Partial empirical adequacy
Bueno’s first suggested generalization can be motivated by the simple observation
that if the appearances are given by partial structures, there can be no isomor-
phisms between the appearances and the empirical substructures of any theory,
because substructures and isomorphisms are defined only for structures. Bueno
(1997, 596) therefore defines the partial substructures of a relational partial struc-
ture, which can easily be generalized to partial structures as follows:
Definition 11. A˜ is a partial substructure of partial structure B˜, A˜ ⊆ B˜, if and
only if A⊆ B , RA˜,+i = RB˜,+i ∩Ami , RA˜,−i = RB˜,−i ∩Ami , RA˜,◦i = RB˜,◦i ∩Ami for all
i ∈ I , F A˜j = F B˜j |An j for all j ∈ J , and c A˜k = cB˜k for all k ∈K .
It is easy to see that if A corresponds to A˜ and B corresponds to B˜, then
A˜⊆ B˜ if and only if A⊆B.
Further, Bueno defines the concept of partial isomorphy between two rela-
tional partial structures, which can also easily be generalized to partial structures:
Definition 12. f : A−→ B is a partial isomorphism between partial structures
A and B if and only if f is a bijection and it holds that f
 
RA˜,+i

= RB˜,+i ,
and f
 
RA˜,−i

= RB˜,−i for each x1, . . . , xmi ∈ A, i ∈ I , f (CA˜, j ) = CB˜, j and
f
 
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j

= F B˜j f (x1) . . . f (xm j ) for each x1, . . . , xn j ∈ CA˜, j , j ∈ J , and
f
 
c A˜k

= cB˜k for each k ∈K .7
A˜ and B˜ are called partially isomorphic (A˜∼= B˜) if and only if there is a partial
isomorphism between A˜ and B˜.8 It is easy to see that if A corresponds to A˜ and
B corresponds to B˜, then A˜∼= B˜ if and only if A∼=B.
7For a relation R over An , f (Ri ) is the image of R under f , that is, f (R) f (x1) . . . f (xn) if and
only if Rx1 . . . xn .
8The concept given by definition 12 must not be confused with the concept that French and
Ladyman (1997, 371, n. 16) name ‘partial isomorphism’, the isomorphism between substructures
(cf. Ebbinghaus et al. 1984, §XI.1).
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Bueno (1997, 596) then assumes that theories are given as families {T˜n}n∈N
of partial structures, with the set of partial empirical substructures E˜n for each
n ∈N .9 But this assumptions is problematic: In constructive empiricism, theories
and their empirical substructures are assumed to be given by normal structures,
not partial structures.10 And it is not obvious how a theory {Tn}n∈N given
by normal structures can be described as a set of partial structures. Of course,
every set of normal structures corresponds to a set of partial structures with
R◦ = ∅, but in this identification quasi-truth, partial substructures, and partial
isomorphisms amount to truth, substructures, and isomorphisms, respectively,
so nothing is gained. There may be a solution to this problem: Given {Tn}n∈N
with {En}n∈N , one can try to find a set M ⊆ ℘N of subsets of N such that for
each m ∈M , {Tn |n ∈ m} is a vagueness set and
⋃
n∈m En is a union of vagueness
sets. Then for each M , {Tn |n ∈ m} corresponds to a partial structure T˜m , and⋃
n∈m En is the union of vagueness sets that correspond to elements of a set E˜m of
partial structures. This provides a partial theory

T˜m
	
m∈M with partial empirical
substructures

E˜m
	
m∈M .
11 In this way, definition 13 may become non-trivially
applicable, although it is not clear how many scientific theories have non-trivial
vagueness sets and sets of empirical substructures.
With these concepts in place, Bueno (1997, 596) gives
Definition 13. A partial theory

T˜n
	
n∈N is partially empirically adequate for the
partial appearances P˜ if and only if there is some n ∈N such that for every P˜ ∈ P˜,
there is an E˜ ∈ E˜n with E˜∼= P˜.
As noted, capturing the appearances as a set of partial structures rather than a
set of structures introduces an epistemic element into empirical adequacy. If there
is no lack of knowledge about the appearances, RA˜,◦i =∅ and CA˜, j = A
n j for all
i ∈ I , j ∈ J and partial structures A˜ that describe the knowledge about the appear-
ances, so that there are structures corresponding to the partial structures. Since
furthermore partial substructures and -isomorphisms generalize substructures
and isomorphisms, definition 13 generalizes definition 3 of empirical adequacy to
partial theories and partial appearances. Therefore, for full information, partial
empirical adequacy is equivalent to empirical adequacy, as demanded.
Since Suárez’s criticism fails, it is not important that partial empirical adequacy
cannot cope with Suárez’s criticism (appendix C.1). A real problem is that almost
no theory is ever partially empirically adequate, and if so, only for a very short
time (with some notable exceptions). This is because the partial appearances are
meant to represent our lack of knowledge of the appearances. And to be partially
empirically adequate, the partial theory must have a partial empirical substructure
9Bueno (2000, §3.2) relies on this assumption as well.
10Note that da Costa and French (1990, 256f) take this into account in their discussion of empirical
adequacy.
11In the following, I will rename the index set M back to N .
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that is partially isomorphic to the partial appearances, and therefore describe our
state of knowledge about the appearances. Formally, for each relation RP˜i of a
partial appearance, there has to be a relation RE˜i of a partial empirical substructure
of the partial theory such that a partial isomorphism maps all and only elements in
RP˜,◦i to elements in R
E˜,◦
i . Therefore, if a theory asserts more about any appearance
than what is currently known, it is not partially empirically adequate. This point
becomes even clearer when considering Bueno’s claim that partial isomorphisms
to partial substructures amount to “approximate embeddings” (Bueno 1997, 597):
If the partial appearances are meant to describe the approximation with which
we know the appearances, then a partial theory is partially empirically adequate
only if for some n ∈N , the partial empirical substructures in E˜n contain the exact
approximations up to which we know the appearances. Therefore, if a partial
theory describes the appearances up to some approximation, the theory is not
partially empirically adequate until we have determined the appearances with
exactly that approximation. Of course, if later the we know a little bit more, the
theory ceases to be partially empirically adequate.12
The concept of approximate empirical adequacy defined in the companion
piece (Lutz 2011, 16) avoids these problems by using, instead of a set P˜ of partial
structures, a set P of vagueness sets for the appearances, which generalizes the
kind of approximations for functions and constants that can be captured in partial
appearances.
Definition 14. Given the approximate appearances P, a theory {Tn}n∈N is ap-
proximately empirically adequate for P if and only if there is some n ∈N such that
for every Q ∈ P, there are aP ∈Q and an E ∈ En with E∼=P.
That definition 14 should be acceptable to Bueno follows from his reason
for dismissing a different suggestion for generalizing empirical adequacy. Instead
of demanding empirical adequacy, one could demand that there be some n such
that for every P˜ ∈ P˜, there are a P˜-normal structureP withP ∈ En . However,
because of the definition of ‘P˜-normal structure’, this would require that the
theory has a set of empirical substructures with the same domains as the partial
appearances. The problem with this requirement, so Bueno (1997, 594), is that
“[i]n practice [ . . . ] we would hardly, if ever, see such a constraint satisfied”.
Definition 14 generalizes a demand that avoids exactly the constraint that Bueno
criticizes:
Claim 4. If each approximate appearance in the approximate appearances P cor-
respond to a partial appearance in the partial appearances P˜, a theory {Tn}n∈N is
approximately empirically adequate for P if and only if there is some n ∈N such that
for every P˜ ∈ P˜, there are a P˜-normal structureP and an E ∈ En with E∼=P.
12Similar criticisms apply to the applications of the notion of partial isomorphism by Bueno
(1999, 67), French (2000, 110f), Bueno (2000, §3.2), da Costa and French (2003, 73, 102, 150, 193),
French (2003, §§4f), and Bueno and Colyvan (2011, §5.3).
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Proof. Immediately from claim 1.
The demand that Bueno dismisses is recovered by substituting ‘=’ for ‘∼=’ in
definition 14 and claim 4. Given that the identity of empirical substructures and
appearances was Bueno’s sole reason for rejecting the generalization, definition 14
should be acceptable. It furthermore avoids the need to introduce partial theories.
Definition 14 does not rely on the notion of a partial isomorphism, but since
that notion has been the basis of much further development in the partial structure
approach (cf. Bueno 1999, 65f; French 2000, 106; Bueno 2000, 278ff; Bueno et al.
2002, 499; da Costa and French 2003, 48ff; French 2003, 1480; Bueno and Colyvan
2011, 14) I show in §A that the concept can be captured and generalized with
vagueness sets.
4.2 Quasi empirical adequacy
Bueno’s second generalization (Bueno 1997, 599ff) starts from the ideas that the
structures of data are often changed in multiple steps into structures of theories
(Suppes 1962), and that theories are not compared directly to data, but more
refined structures (Bogen and Woodward 1988). To capture both points, Bueno
(1997, 600f) gives an informal description of a hierarchy of partial structures (cf.
French and Ladyman 1999, 113). Since he makes a distinction between partial
structures with finite and with infinite domains, this can be captured in two more
formal definitions.
Definition 15. A hierarchy of finite partial structures is a finite sequence 〈A˜l 〉1≤l≤m
of relational partial structures with finite domains for the ni -place relation symbols
{Ri}i∈I ,13 such that (i) A˜m corresponds to a structure, and (ii) for all 1≤ l < m
and i ∈ I , card RA˜l ,◦i > card RA˜l+1,◦i , and card(Al )≥ card(Al+1).14
Definition 16. A hierarchy of infinite partial structures is a finite sequence
〈A˜l 〉1≤l≤m of relational partial structures with finite domains for the ni -place
relation symbols {Ri}i∈I , such that (i) A˜m corresponds to a structure and (ii) for
all 1≤ l < m and i ∈ I , RA˜l ,◦i ⊃ RA˜l+1,◦i .
A hierarchy of partial structures is either a hierarchy of finite or a hierarchy of
infinite partial structures.
Bueno (1997, 601) further defines a reduced partial structure A˜ of a partial
structure B˜ to be a partial substructure of B˜ such that every element of A˜’s
domain has been measured at some point with a specific measurement result.
13That all structures are for the same relation symbols is only implicitly suggested by (my
paraphrase of) Bueno’s informal description of the partial models of the phenomena below.
14The cardinality condition on the domains is implicit in Bueno’s claim that from card
 
RA˜l ,◦i

>
card
 
RA˜l+1 ,◦i

, it follows that card
 
RA˜l ,+i ) < card
 
RA˜l+1 ,+i

or card
 
RA˜l ,−i

< card
 
RA˜l+1 ,−i

given
that all structures in the domain are for the same relation symbols.
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Finally, Bueno (1997, 601, 607) seems to define the partial models of the phenomena
to be a hierarchy of partial structures (a) whose lowest partial structure represents
the data, (b) whose highest partial structure represents the appearances, and (c)
where there is a cardinal number w such that the partial structure at each level has a
reduced partial structure with a domain of cardinality w.15 By definition 11, there
is for every partial structure A˜ and set B ⊆ A a partial substructure C˜⊆ A˜ with
C = B . Therefore, since partial structures have non-empty domains, condition
(iii) simply demands that for each 1≤ l ≤ m, at least one element of domain Al
has been measured.
Bueno (1997, 601, my notation) claims that partial models of the phenomena
formalize the idea that
at each level, partial relations R, which were not yet defined at a lower
level (whose elements thus belong to R◦) come to be defined: either
taking their elements as belonging to the domain of R (i. e. R+) or
belonging to the complement of R (that is, R−). The partial relations
are extended until one obtains normal (total) structures. These are
then to be compared to scientific theories in testing them.
This description is rather misleading, for one because it suggests that each new
level in the hierarchy introduces new relations, which is not true. What Bueno
probably means is that at each level A˜l and for each relation symbol Ri , tuples of
members of the domain that were borderline cases at the lower level A˜l−1 (and
thus belong to RA˜l−1,◦i ) come to be included either in the positive extension of Ri
(i. e., RA˜l ,+i ) or in the negative extension of Ri (i. e., R
A˜l ,−
i ).
16
The definition of a hierarchy of partial structures has a number of quirks that
become problems in the definition of the partial models of the phenomena. One is
that a partial structure A˜l with R
A˜l ,◦
i =∅ for some, but not all i ∈ I cannot occur
in a hierarchy. For condition (ii) demands that card
 
RA˜l ,◦i

> card
 
RA˜l+1,◦i

or
RA˜l ,◦i ⊃ RA˜l+1,◦i for all i ∈ I . If thus RA˜l ,◦i =∅ for some i ∈ I , condition (ii) cannot
be fulfilled by RA˜l+1,◦i , so that Al must be the highest level of the hierarchy. But
this is impossible because the highest level must correspond to a structure, so that
RA˜l ,◦i =∅ for all i ∈ I . This problem can easily be solved by slightly modifying
condition (ii), demanding only card
 
RA˜l ,◦i
≥ card RA˜l+1,◦i  in definition 15 and
RA˜l ,◦i ⊇ RA˜l+1,◦i in definition 16 for all i ∈ I . To have an asymmetric relation, one
could further demand that the respective converse relation does not hold for all
i ∈ I .
15Conditions (a) and (b) are inferred from Bueno’s informal discussion.
16Bueno (personal communication) has confirmed that this is an accurate paraphrase.
13
Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy II—Draft: 2010–07–26
A bigger problem is that the demands on the relations are radically different
for hierarchies of finite and infinite domains. Infinite structures form a hierarchy if
from one level to the next, some borderline cases of each relation symbol become
members of its positive or negative extension, but not vice versa. The relations
of finite structures, on the other hand, only have to have a decreasing number
of borderline cases, no matter which ones they are. This means that the concept
of a hierarchy of infinite partial structures does not generalize the concept of a
hierarchy of finite partial structures: If A˜l =


A, RA˜l1

with RA˜l ,◦1 := {a, b}, and
A˜l+1 is such that R
A˜ j+1,◦
1 := {c}, then card
 
RA˜l ,◦i

> card
 
R
A˜ j+1,◦
i

, but RA˜l ,◦i 6⊃
R
A˜ j+1,◦
i . Note also that for infinite domains, the elements in R
A˜l ,◦
i for any i ∈ I ,
1 ≤ l ≤ m have to be in every RA˜l ,◦i , k ≤ l , so that, since RA˜l ,◦i 6= 0 for all i ∈ I ,
1 ≤ l < m, partial structures at all levels except the last one have to have some
elements in common. In contradistinction, the domains of the finite structures
can change completely from one level to the next.
This has a number of odd implications. First and foremost, there is no obvious
reason for the change in condition (ii). If the subset-relation is justified for infinite
domains, its lack of justification for finite domains first has to be shown. Second,
it is not clear how to define a hierarchy of partial structures some of which have
finite, and some of which have infinite domains. Third, any concept relying on the
concept of a hierarchy of partial structures will also have very different properties
for finite and infinite domains. This, though, renders typical scientific methods
unusable, for example the use of limiting cases, where a very big but finite domain
is used as approximation of an infinite domain. Results for finite domains thus
will typically have little bearing on results for infinite domains, and vice versa.
The biggest problem of the concept of a hierarchy of partials structures,
however, is starkly illustrated by Bueno’s own informal description (quoted above)
of each level in the hierarchy as “extending” the relations of the partial structure
from the previous level. In the rest of his article, Bueno (e. g., 1997, 592–593) uses
the concept of one relation “extending” another only to state that the relations
{RAi }i∈I in an A˜l -normal structure A extend the relations {RA˜li }i∈I . This entails
that to A corresponds a partial structure A˜ so that for all i ∈ I , RA˜l ,+i ⊆ RA˜,+i and
RA˜l ,−i ⊆ RA˜,−i . The natural generalization of this notion is that the same subset
condition also holds between all relations of any two partial structures where the
relations of the one extend the relations of the other. But understood in this way,
Bueno’s informal description goes against his definition of hierarchies of infinite
and of finite partial structures. For infinite domains, a member of the positive
extension RA˜l ,+i may be in the negative extension R
A˜l+1,−
i and vice versa. For finite
domains, any instance, non-instance, or borderline case can become an instance,
non-instance, or borderline case on the next level of the hierarchy, as long as the
number of borderline cases overall decreases. It is thus a stretch to say that the
14
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hierarchy is “built in such a way that, at each level, there is a gain of information
regarding the phenomena being modeled” (Bueno 1997, 603), since at each level,
any information one has about the domain can be negated on the next level. For
then one would convey information by saying: “They are certainly scoundrels,
though they may not be”.17
This problem is so severe that the relation of the highest level of a pragmatic
empirical hierarchy to the rest of the hierarchy is almost trivial:
Claim 5. Let B˜m be any partial structure for {Ri}i∈I that corresponds to a struc-
ture. If 〈Al 〉1≤l≤m is any hierarchy of infinite partial structures for {Ri}i∈I , then
〈A˜l ,B˜m〉1≤l<m is also a hierarchy of infinite partial structures. If 〈A˜l 〉1≤l≤m is any
hierarchy of finite partial structures for {Ri}i∈I with card(Am−1)≥ card(Bm), then
〈A˜l ,B˜m〉1≤l<m is also a hierarchy of finite partial structures. (This holds whether the
definitions use ‘⊃’, ‘⊇’, ‘>’, or ‘≥’ in condition (ii).)
Proof. If condition (ii) is formulated with ‘⊃’, then RA˜m−1,◦i 6= ∅ for all i ∈ I .
Since RB˜m ,◦i =∅ for all i ∈ I and the empty set is a proper subset of every non-
empty set, condition (ii) is fulfilled. If condition (ii) is formulated with ‘>’, then
card
 
RA˜m−1,◦i

> 0= card
 
RB˜m ,◦i

for all i ∈ I . If condition (ii) is formulated with
‘⊇’ or ‘≥’, the proof is immediate.
Therefore any level of a hierarchy of partial structures except the highest one
only restricts the relation symbols of the partial structure at the highest level (and
in the finite case also the maximal size of the domain).18
This almost trivial restriction of the highest level of the hierarchy of partial
structures by the lower levels is not strengthened in Bueno’s definition of the
partial models of the phenomena, for the only additional restriction on the
structure at the highest level of the hierarchy is that at least one object in its
domain must have been measured.
Bueno (1997, 602, my notation) goes on to define that a theory
is empirically adequate if it is pragmatically true in the (partial) em-
pirical substructure E˜ according to a structure A, where A is the last
level of the hierarchy of models of phenomena (being thus a total
structure).
A sentence is “pragmatically true in E˜ according to A” if and only if it is true in
A and A is E˜-normal (Bueno 1997, 592, my notation). Note that this definition
of what I will call ‘pragmatic empirical adequacy’ assumes that the theory is
17In some contexts, of course, this sentence can convey information by way of conversational
implicature (for an example, see Hammett 1928, 115–120).
18These criticisms also apply to the applications of the hierarchies by Bueno (1999, §3.1), French
and Ladyman (1999, 112–114) Bueno et al. (2002, §2), da Costa and French (2003, 68–74), and Bueno
and Colyvan (2011, §5.3, n. 25).
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given by a sentence or possibly a set thereof. A theory is thus pragmatically
empirically adequate if and only if it is true in a structure that is E˜-normal for a
partial empirical substructure E˜ of the theory and is the highest level of the partial
models of the phenomena.
This definition has a number of peculiar features that cast its adequacy into
doubt. For one, it defines pragmatic empirical adequacy relative to a single
hierarchy of partial structures, with a single structure on its highest level that
represents the appearances. Hence the definition presumes, contrary to van
Fraassen, that there is only one appearance. Second, a theory is pragmatically
empirically adequate if and only if it is true in the highest level of the partial
models of the phenomena, that is, in the single appearance. Thus empirical
adequacy is the same as truth in the structure of the appearance, which trivializes
van Fraassen’s idea of substituting empirical adequacy for truth as the goal of
science. Third, since A is E˜-normal, A= E , so that all the objects that occur in
the theory also have to occur in its partial empirical substructure, which thereby
is not a proper substructure. Fourth, there is only the almost trivial relation
between the appearances at the highest level and the data at the lowest level of the
models of the phenomena. Claim 5 shows that the last level is almost independent
from the lower levels, so that, if the data are meant to determine the appearances,
the notion of pragmatic empirical adequacy is almost trivial. If, on the other hand,
the appearances are determined on their own, then pragmatic empirical adequacy
simply presumes that the appearance is given by a structure, not a partial structure,
and thus does not differ in this respect from empirical adequacy. A corollary of
these four points is that pragmatic empirical adequacy clearly does not properly
generalize empirical adequacy. The effects of these modifications of empirical
adequacy on Suárez’s criticism are discussed in §C.2.
The fifth peculiarity of the definition is that it contradicts the presupposition
of Bueno’s claim that “there is no problem with the fact that E and A have distinct
domains” (Bueno 1997, 603, my notation). There is indeed no problem, but only
because E˜ and A have the same domain, since A is E-normal. Oddly, Bueno (1997,
603, n. 16) seems to acknowledge this in a footnote, in which he states that “one
of the conditions for a total structure to be employed as one that extends the
relations of a partial structure, is that both of them have the same domain. Such a
condition obviously could not hold here.”19 This identity of the domain of the
partial appearance and the partial empirical substructure should be fatal for the
definition according to Bueno’s own standards, since he has dismissed another
suggestion for generalizing empirical adequacy on exactly these grounds.
Finally, the definition is in tension with Bueno’s informal description. Bueno
19He adds that “the condition can be easily changed for a weaker one, still preserving the main
features of the concept of pragmatic truth. I have pursued this line of argument elsewhere [ . . . ].”
The reference (Bueno and de Souza 1996), however, gives no indication on how to avoid the identity
of the domains of E˜ and A, as it does not discuss possible relations between partial structures with
different domains.
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(1997, 603) states:
The basic point of [the definition] consists in the fact that, intuitively,
a theory is empirically adequate if that part of it which is concerned
with the observable phenomena (its empirical substructures) can be
extended to a total structure that represents the information provided
by the observational side of ‘experience’ (the last level in the hierarchy
of partial models of phenomena).
If partial empirical substructures E˜ are given through vagueness sets, the E˜-normal
structures are just empirical substructures of {Tn}n∈N . The highest level of
the models of the phenomena also corresponds to a structureP. If a structure is
represented by another through an isomorphism between the two, a theory is then
pragmatically empirically adequate if and only if one of its empirical substructures
is isomorphic to the appearance P. Thus pragmatic empirical adequacy differs
from empirical adequacy only in that there can be only one appearance, and there
must also be an almost unrelated data structure.
This article companion piece contains a generalization of empirical adequacy
that avoids all of the above criticisms. First, it provides a substitute for Bueno’s
notion of the models of the phenomena:
Definition 17. A restricted hierarchy of approximate appearances is a sequence
〈Pl 〉l∈L of approximate appearances such that for any l ≤ m with l , m ∈ L, there
is a bijection b : Pl −→ Pm such that for all Q ∈ Pl , b (Q)⊆Q.
This definition leads to a real increase of information from one point of the
hierarchy to the next, allows more than one appearance, and is not restricted to
hierarchies of finitely many levels.
Second, one can define which appearances are possible given the knowledge
ones has about them at some point:
Definition 18. Given approximate appearances P, P′ are approximately possible
appearances if and only if P′ = {e(Q) |Q ∈ P}, where e is any function from Pm to⋃
P with e(Q) ∈Q.
Thus for every vagueness set in the approximate appearances, any of its mem-
bers can be a member of the appearances.
These definitions lead to the following result:
Claim 6. {Tn}n∈N is approximately empirically adequate at all points of all restricted
hierarchies of approximate appearances with the initial sequence 〈Pl 〉l≤m if and only
if {Tn}n∈N is empirically adequate for all appearances that are epistemically possible
given Pl .
Proof. (Lutz 2011, proof of claim 7)
Thus the growth of information can be represented by the restricted hierarchy
of approximate appearances, and at each point of the hierarchy, it is clear which
theories are approximately empirically adequate.
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5 Conclusion
The notion of a vagueness set generalizes the notion of a partial structure to allow
imprecise functions and constants, and allows to capture the notion of a partial
isomorphism without the use of partial functions. These results are helpful in that
they show that vagueness sets can be used to formalize all theories, models, and
appearances that can be formalized in partial structures, and can in fact formalize
more. That vagueness sets do not rely on any new technical notions allows a
simple transfer of known results from model theory. Furthermore, vagueness
sets are the basis of the notions of approximate empirical adequacy and restricted
hierarchy of approximate empirical appearances, which seem capture the basic
intuition behind Bueno’s notions of partial and pragmatic empirical adequacy
without succumbing to their problems.
Together with the results of this article’s companion piece, these results show
the adequacy and flexibility of vagueness sets, approximate empirical adequacy,
and hierarchies of approximate empirical appearances.
A Partial isomorphisms in terms of vagueness sets
Claim 7. Let A and B be the vagueness sets corresponding to partial structures A˜ and
B˜ with Π˜ = ∅. Then f is a partial isomorphism between A˜ and B˜ if and only if
for all A ∈A there is aB ∈ B and for allB ∈ B there is an A ∈A such that f is an
isomorphism between A andB.
Proof. ‘⇒’: Let f : A −→ B be a partial isomorphism between A˜ and B˜
and let A be in A. By claim 1, A is A˜-normal for ∅. Since f is a bi-
jection, it is an isomorphism from A to B with RBi = f
 
RAi

for each
i ∈ I , FBj x1 . . . xn j = f
 
F Aj f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xm j )

for each x1, . . . , xn j ∈ B n j ,
j ∈ J , and cBk = f
 
cAk

for each k ∈ K . Furthermore, B is B˜-normal,
because first, RB˜,+i = f
 
RA˜,+i
 ⊆ f  RAi  = RBi ⊆ f  RA˜,−i  = RB˜,−i . Sec-
ond, C
B˜, j = f
 
C
A˜, j

and hence FBj x1 . . . xn j = f
 
F Aj f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xn j )

=
f
 
F A˜j f
−1(x1) . . . f −1(xn j )

= F B˜j x1 . . . xn j for all x1, . . . , xn j ∈ CB˜. Third,
cBk = f
 
cAk

= f
 
c A˜k

= cB˜k . By claim 1,B ∈ B. By the same reasoning, ifB ∈ B,
there is an A ∈ A such that f −1 and thus f is an isomorphism between A and
B.20
‘⇐’: Assume that f : A−→ B is a bijection but not a partial isomorphism
between A˜ and B˜. Then there are an i ∈ I and some x1, . . . , xmi ∈ A such
that (i) RA,+i x1 . . . xmi and not R
B,+
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (ii) not R
A,+
i x1 . . . xmi and
RB,+i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (iii) R
A,−
i x1 . . . xmi and not R
B,−
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) or (iv)
20This half of the proof generalizes the rough proof given by Bueno (2000, 279f).
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not RA,−i x1 . . . xmi and R
B,−
i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ), or there is a j ∈ J such that for
some x1, . . . , xm j ∈ A, (v) CA˜, j x1 . . . xm j and not CB˜, j f (x1) . . . f (xm j ) or (vi) not
C
A˜, j x1 . . . xm j and CB˜, j f (x1) . . . f (xm j ) or (vii) for some (x1, . . . , xm j ) ∈ CA˜, j ,
f
 
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j
 6= F B˜j f (x1) . . . f xn j , or (viii) there is a k ∈K such that f c A˜k 6= cB˜k .
It is to be shown that (∗) there is an A ∈A for which there is noB ∈ B or there is
anB ∈A for which there is no A ∈A such that f is an isomorphism between A
andB.
If (i) holds for some i ∈ I and x1, . . . , xmi , then choose an A˜-normal structure
with RAi x1 . . . xmi , if (ii) holds for some i ∈ I and x1, . . . , xmi , then choose an
B˜-normal structure with RBi f (x1) . . . f (xmi ), and analogously for (iii) and (iv).
Then, if f is an isomorphism between A and B, in case (i) B is not B˜-normal
because RB,+i f (x1) . . . f (xmi ) does not hold, in case (ii) A is not A˜-normal because
RA,+i x1 . . . xmi does not hold, and analogously for (iii) and (iv). If (v) holds for
some j ∈ J and x1, . . . , xn j ∈ A, choose FBj f (x1), . . . , f (xn j ) 6= f
 
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j

,
and analogously for (vi). Then, if f is an isomorphism between A and B, in
case (v) A is not A˜-normal because F Aj x1 . . . xn j = f
−1 FBj f (x1) . . . f (xn j ) 6=
F A˜j x1 . . . xn j , and analogously for (vii). For any A˜-normal structure A and any B˜-
normal structureB, if (vii) holds, F Aj x1, . . . , xn j = F
A˜
j x1 . . . xn j 6= F B˜j x1, . . . , xn j =
FBj x1, . . . , xn j and if (viii) holds, c
A
k = c
A˜
k 6= cB˜k = cBk . (∗) follows by claim 1.
B Suárez’s criticism of empirical adequacy
According to a criticism by Suárez (1995; 2005), van Fraassen’s notion of empirical
adequacy does not, pace van Fraassen (1980, 12), capture what it means that a
theory “saves the phenomena”. The structure of Suárez’s argument is simple: In
the 1930s, electromagnetic theory was considered to save the phenomenon of
superconductivity, but electromagnetic theory has no empirical substructure21
that is isomorphic to this phenomenon and is thus not empirically adequate.
Therefore, the two notions cannot be equivalent.
In slightly more detail, Suárez (2005, §6.1) considers the classic electromagnetic
theory to include Maxwell’s equations in matter, which give the relations between
the electric field ~E , magnetic field ~B , the electric displacement field ~D , the magne-
tizing field ~H , the charge density ρ, the current density~, the time t , and the speed
of light c . It also includes the acceleration equation, which gives an additional
21With a reference to Suppes (2002, 62), Suárez (2005, 38) defines a substructure of T to have
possibly fewer relations than T. This is rather the definition of a relativized reduct (Lutz 2011, §4.1),
and misconstrues van Fraassen’s notion of empirical adequacy and Suppes’s definition. Suárez (2005,
39) weakens empirical adequacy even further (cf. Lutz 2011, §2.1), but since he argues that empirical
adequacy is too strong, these changes do not threaten his conclusion.
19
Sebastian Lutz Generalizing Empirical Adequacy II—Draft: 2010–07–26
relation between ~H , the magnetic field ~H0 at time t = 0, and the penetration
depth Λ, and which was meant to deal with the behavior of the magnetic flux
in superconductors. The acceleration equation therefore describes the empirical
substructure of the classic electromagnetic theory as far as superconductivity is
concerned. But the magnetic field ~H in superconductors in fact is, with slight
idealizations, correctly described by the Londons’ equation for Λ, c , and ~H , which
therefore describes the structure of the appearances.
There is, as is demanded for empirical adequacy, a bijection between the
domains of the empirical substructure and the structure of the appearances, since,
according to Suárez (2005, 54)
the two domains are isomorphic: for every physical entity (i. e. ~j , ~H ,
etc.) in the domain over which the ‘acceleration equation’ model is
defined, there is a corresponding entity in the domain of the London
model.
But the Londons’ equation is incompatible with the acceleration equation (i. e.,
their conjunction is inconsistent), so that the structures cannot be isomorphic.
There can also be no other empirical substructure of the classic electromagnetic
theory that could be isomorphic to the Londons’ equation, since then the theory
would yield incompatible predictions for the same domain and would thus be
inconsistent.
One could also take electromagnetic theory to consist only of Maxwell’s
equations, without the acceleration equation. This theory is compatible with the
Londons’ equation, but, says Suárez (2005, 55), it
can provide neither an accurate nor an inaccurate representation of
superconductivity phenomena—it can provide no representation at
all! The phenomenon of superconductivity simply lies outside the the-
ory’s domain of empirical adequacy, and the question of embedding
[ . . . ] of [the phenomena] simply does not arise.
There are a number of problems with Suárez’s argument. The main one is its
overly impressionistic nature. Suárez does not define a family of structures for
the classic electromagnetic theory, nor does he define its empirical substructures.
Instead, he mentions the equations that hold for the functions that occur in the
respective structures. For this reason, his description of the domain of the theory
may seem more plausible than it is: According to Suárez, the domain of the empir-
ical substructure contains the physical quantities ~ and ~H , so that, apparently, the
domain of the classical electromagnetic theory contains the physical quantities that
occur in Maxwell’s equations and the acceleration equation: ~E ,~B , ~D , ~H , ~H0,ρ,~, c ,
and Λ. (I am unsure about the way in which time development would be rep-
resented in this formalization.) The relations that hold between these objects
are thus, presumably, the equations themselves. Suárez (2005, 54) furthermore
seems to consider any equation that follows from these equations to be part of the
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structure, since he claims on the ground that one equation follows from both the
Londons’ and the acceleration equation that “at least one relation over the domain
is isomorphic”.
The empirical substructures of the classic electromagnetic theory therefore are
structures that contain some, but not necessarily all, of the quantities that occur
in the classic electromagnetic theory itself. The first part of Suárez’s argument
then is that the relations that are given by Maxwell’s equation and the acceleration
equation cannot be fulfilled by the same objects that fulfill the relation given
by the Londons’ equation, since the equations are incompatible. The second,
rather loosely formulated part of his argument could be reconstructed as follows:
Maxwell’s equations alone do not entail the Londons’ equation, and therefore
there is no relation in any structure of the electromagnetic theory (as described by
Maxwell’s equations) that corresponds to the Londons’ equation. Since any sub-
structure of a structure has the same relations as the structure itself, no empirical
substructure of the electromagnetic theory can be isomorphic to a structure that
contains the Londons’ equation.
Suárez’s formalization of the electromagnetic theory is very close to the
received view: The physical quantities in the empirical substructures can be seen
as the observation terms, and the relations that occur in all of these substructures
are the implications of the theory in the observational vocabulary. The relations
that occur in none are incompatible with the theory. On the other hand, a
formalization in van Fraassen’s spirit would rather describe the phase space of
the systems with the respective physical quantities (van Fraassen 1980, 67). In the
phase space description of a system of finitely many objects, each quantity of each
object is assigned a dimension of the phase space, so that at each time, the values
of all quantities of all objects are given by a single point in phase space. For a field,
each point in physical space can have a different value, so that each quantity of
each point in physical space would have to be assigned a dimension in phase space.
This would result in a non-denumerable dimensional phase space, which would
be, at best, very unwieldy.
Not as close to van Fraassen’s preferred formalization but still typical in
the semantic view would be to give a structure with physical spacetime in its
domain, the physical quantities ~E , ~B , ~D, ~H , and ~ as functions from spacetime
points to triples of real numbers, the physical quantity ρ as a function from
spacetime points to real numbers, ~H0 as a constant in R3, and c and Λ as real
constants. Maxwell’s, the Londons’, and the acceleration equation would then be
demanded to hold between these functions and constants of the structures. Since
the Londons’ equation describes superconductors, the empirical substructures of
electromagnetic theory that have to be isomorphic to the appearances are those
whose domains (subsets of spacetime) contain only superconducting material. In
a formalization that follows this sketch, Suárez’s argument against the empirical
adequacy of classic electromagnetic theory is valid, since a the functions and
constants cannot simultaneously fulfill two incompatible equations. However,
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Suárez’s argument against the empirical adequacy of the electromagnetic theory
as described by Maxwell’s equations alone fails: A structure with the points in
physical space and the real numbers as its domain and the physical quantities given
above as its relations is a structure of the electromagnetic theory if and only if
the physical quantities fulfill Maxwell’s equations. Since Maxwell’s equations are
compatible with the Londons’ equations for restricted domains, there are empirical
substructures of the electromagnetic theory that are isomorphic to the structure
of the phenomenon of superconductivity as described by the Londons’ equation.
Therefore, the electromagnetic theory as described by Maxwell’s equations is
empirically adequate for the phenomenon of superconductivity.
Therefore, Suárez’s criticism is not fatal for the concept of empirical adequacy,
because in a plausible formalization, only the classic electromagnetic theory fails
to be empirically adequate. And this is as it should be, since the acceleration
equation describes the appearances incorrectly, and the conjunction of Maxwell’s
equation and the acceleration equation can therefore not be considered to save the
appearances.
C Bueno’s reply to Suárez
C.1 Partial empirical adequacy
According to Bueno (1997, §4.4, my notation), classic electromagnetic theory
as described by Maxwell’s equation and the acceleration equation is partially
empirically adequate, so that his generalization of empirical adequacy to partial
empirical adequacy avoids Suárez first criticism:
Indeed, the kind of new relation discovered at the phenomenologi-
cal level might be represented by one of those partial relations that
initially were not defined for some elements of the domain under
investigation (whose elements thus belong to its R◦-component), and
with the introduction of further bits of information, came to be
defined—hence, the relevant elements belong then either to its do-
main (R+-component), or to its complement (R−-component).
This reply to Suárez is rather vague, but it seems that the Londons’ equation is
the “new relation discovered” between objects of the domain, or better: It is the
discovery that some relation holds between objects of the domain (Bueno is thus
relying on Suárez’s formalization).
A major problem with this reply is that it is not clear in what way the notion
of partial empirical adequacy is time dependent, and thus it is not clear how the
discovery that some elements of the domain have some relation can be represented
as partial empirical adequacy. Another problem is that it is utterly artificial to use
partial relations to formalize a situation in which an equation is discovered to hold
between physical quantities: Before the Londons’ equation was discovered to hold
for Λ, c , and ~H , no one was of the opinion that it held for, say c , c , and ~D and
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was wondering whether it also held for other physical quantities of the above list.
Staying in Suárez’s formalization, it was rather that the Londons discovered a new
relation—just as Bueno puts it informally in his reply quoted above. Finally, Suárez
(2005, §6.2) points out that, since the acceleration equation is incompatible with
the Londons’ equation, Λ, c , and ~H are, according to the acceleration equation,
certainly not in the relation described by the Londons’ equation. That is, in
any partial appearance P˜, RP˜,+i Λc
~H holds,22 where Ri is given by the Londons’
equation. The partial isomorphism f to the empirical substructure then gives
RE˜,+i f (Λ) f (c) f (
~H ) for the analogue of the Londons’ equation in the theory. But
this would lead to inconsistency, since according to the classic electromagnetic
theory, RE˜,−i f (Λ) f (c) f ( ~H ).
In the formalization that I have sketched, the classic electromagnetic theory is
not partially empirically adequate either: The domain of the Londons’ equation
consists of the space-time volumes that contain superconductors, and its terms are
Λ, c , and ~H . In each appearance of superconductivity, these terms’ interpretations
fulfill the Londons’ equation. Since this is known, every partial structure P˜ of
the appearances must be such that no P˜-normal structure fulfills the Londons’
equation. The classic electromagnetic theory, on the other hand, must be such
that for no partial empirical substructure E˜, there is an E˜-normal structure that
fulfills the Londons’ equation, since it is part of the theory that the Londons’
equation is not fulfilled by superconductors. Since no P˜-normal and E˜-normal
structures are isomorphic, P˜ and E˜ are not partially isomorphic either by claims
1 and 7 (§A). Electromagnetic theory as described by Maxwell’s equations is
partially empirically adequate, however, for partial empirical adequacy generalizes
empirical adequacy and electromagnetic theory is empirically adequate.
C.2 Quasi empirical adequacy
The requirements for the pragmatic empirical adequacy of a theory are almost
trivially weak. This has the intended effect of avoiding Suárez’s counterexample if
the relation described by the Londons’ equation is considered to determine the
structure of the data (the lowest level of the models of the phenomena), not the
appearance at the highest level: While the relation between Λ, c , and ~H described
by the Londons’ equation has to hold for the structure of the data, the structure of
the appearances can contain any relation between Λ, c , and ~H under one further
condition: At least one element in the domain of the highest level must have
been measured. Apart from this condition, one can choose any structure with
the acceleration equation as relation between Λ, c , and ~H . Therefore the classic
electromagnetic theory is pragmatically empirically adequate.
In the formalization of the classic electromagnetic theory that I have sketched,
22That is, the tuple 〈Λ, c , ~H 〉 clearly fulfills relation RP˜i .
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the case is similar: The domain of the Londons’ equation contains the spacetime
volumes that contain superconductors, and its terms are Λ, c , and ~H . (To apply
Bueno’s definitions for relational structures, the theory first has to be reformulated
to contain only relations rather than functions and constants.) Since the domain of
the appearances, the spacetime volume of the superconductors, is infinite, there is
no restriction on the domain of the highest level of the models of the phenomena.
One can now choose a structure with the same terms and at least one measured
object in its domain in which the classic electromagnetic theory is true, so that the
theory is pragmatically empirically adequate. Of course, this strength of Bueno’s
definition is also a huge weakness, since any other theory with the same relation
symbols is pragmatically empirically adequate as well.
In summary, the notion of partial empirical adequacy does not avoid Suárez’s
criticism, and the notion of pragmatic empirical adequacy solves it, but only on
pain of triviality. Neither failure poses a problem for empirical adequacy or the
project of constructive empiricism in general, however, because Suárez’s criticism
is an artifact of an ill-chosen formalization of the theory of electromagnetism.
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